We develop a model in which the capital of the intermediary sector plays a critical role in determining asset prices. The model is cast within a dynamic general equilibrium economy, and the role for intermediation is derived endogenously based on optimal contracting considerations.
Introduction
Financial crises, such as the hedge fund crisis of 1998 or the 2007/2008 subprime crisis, have several common characteristics: risk premia rise, interest rates fall, conditional volatilities of asset prices rise, correlations between assets rise, and investors " ‡y to the quality" of a riskless liquid bond. This paper o¤ers an account of a …nancial crisis in which intermediaries play the central role.
Intermediaries are the marginal investors in our model. The crisis occurs because shocks to the capital of intermediaries reduce their risk-bearing capacity, leading to a dynamic that replicates each of the afore-mentioned regularities. These results are developed within a dynamic general equilibrium model with a contractual micro-foundation for intermediation.
The intermediation model also o¤ers insights into …nancial behavior outside of crises. A number of recent papers have documented the existence of a priced liquidity risk factor (see Amihud, 2002;  Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; and Sadka, 2006) . That is, these papers show that assets whose payo¤s are low during times of marketwide illiquidity carry high ex-ante risk premia. The …nancial crisis of our model can be readily viewed as an illiquidity episode. We show that intermediaries, who are central to the dynamics of a …nancial crisis, will demand assets that help them hedge against a …nancial crisis. This hedging behavior, since the intermediaries are also marginal in pricing assets, leads to a priced liquidity risk factor. Our paper makes two principal contributions: (1) we show that modeling intermediaries can help to explain a collection of asset market facts both inside and outside of …nancial crises; and, (2) we o¤er a model of intermediation and crises that is fully dynamic and less stylistic than some of the existing models in the literature. 1 There is a large literature on intermediation and asset pricing, ranging from banking models to models of portfolio delegation. 2 Our paper is closest to the banking models in that we emphasize capital e¤ects. Allen and Gale (1994) present a model in which the amount of "cash" of the marginal investors a¤ects asset prices. This "cash-in-the-market" can be linked to the balance sheet position of intermediaries, and Allen and Gale (2005) draw such a connection more explicitly.
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) present a model in which there is a role for intermediary capital, and 1 In a companion paper (He and Krishnamurthy, 2008) , we develop this second point by incorporating additional realistic features into the model so that it can be calibrated. We show that the calibrated model can quantitatively match crisis and non-crisis asset market behavior. 2 Some of the papers in the literature include Allen and Gorton (1993), Brennan (1993) , Dow and Gorton (1994) , Grossman and Zhou (1996) , Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2008) , Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) , and Guerrieri and Kondor (2008). changes in this capital a¤ect asset prices (the interest rate in Holmstrom and Tirole). The models in these papers are stylized one or two period models, which we go beyond. The micro-foundation for intermediation in our model draws from the Holmstrom and Tirole model. Xiong (2001) , Kyle and Xiong (2001) , and Vayanos (2005) develop dynamic models to study crises and illiquidity. Both Xiong (2001) and Kyle and Xiong (2001) papers model a capital e¤ect for asset prices and show that this e¤ect can help to explain some of the crises regularities we have noted. These papers model an "arbitrageur" sector using a shorthand log utility assumption. In contrast, we develop a role for intermediation within the model, derive the constraints endogenously from an explicit principal-agent problem, and are thereby better able to articulate the part of intermediaries in crises. 3 These models also do not speak to the issue of liquidity risk. Vayanos friction, rather than a capital friction, into a model of intermediation. 4 Empirically, the evidence for an intermediation capital e¤ect comes in two forms. First, by now it is widely accepted that the fall of 1998 crisis was due to negative shocks to the capital of intermediaries (hedge funds, market makers, trading desks, etc.). These shocks led intermediaries to liquidate positions, which lowered asset prices, further weakening intermediary balance sheets. 5 Similar capital-related phenomena have been noted in the 1987 stock-market crash (Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2007) , the mortgage-backed securities market following an unexpected prepayment wave in 1994 (Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron, 2006) , as well the corporate bond market following the Enron default (Berndt, et al., 2004) . Froot and O'Connell (1999) , and Froot ( 2001) present evidence that the insurance cycle in the catastrophe insurance market is due to ‡uctuations in the capital of reinsurers. Du¢ e (2007) discusses some of these cases in the context of search costs 3 The same distinction exists between our paper and Pavlova and Rigobon (2008) , who study a model with logutility agents facing exogenous portfolio constraints and use the model to explore some regularities in exchange rates and international …nancial crises. Like us, their model shows how contagion and ampli…cation can arise endogenously. While their application to international …nancial crises di¤ers from our model, at a deeper level the models are related. 4 Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Liu and Longsta¤ (2004) study settings in which an arbitrageur with limited wealth and facing a capital constraint trades to exploit a high Sharpe-ratio investment. Liu and Longsta¤ show that the capital constraint can substantially a¤ect the arbitrageur's optimal trading strategy. Gromb and Vayanos show that the capital constraints can have important asset pricing e¤ects. Both of these papers point to the importance of a capital e¤ect for asset pricing. 5 Other important asset markets, such as the equity or housing market, were relatively una¤ected by the turmoil. The dichotomous behavior of asset markets suggests that the problem was hedge fund capital speci…cally, and not capital more generally. Investors did not bypass the distressed hedge funds in a way as to undo any asset price impact of the hedge fund actions. They also did not restore the hedge funds'capital. and slow movement of capital into the a¤ected intermediated markets. One of the motivations for our paper is to reproduce asset market behavior during crisis episodes.
Although the crisis evidence is dramatic, crisis episodes are rare and do not lend themselves to systematic study. The second form of evidence for the existence of intermediation capital effects come from studies examining the cross-sectional/time-series behavior of asset prices within a particular asset market. Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2006) study a cross-section of prices in the mortgage-backed securities market and present evidence that the marginal investor who prices these assets is a specialized intermediary rather than a CAPM-type representative investor. Similar evidence has been provided for index options (Bates, 2003; Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman, 2005) , and corporate bonds and default swaps (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin, 2001; Berndt, et al., 2004) . These studies are particularly good motivation for our model because the markets they consider tend to be ones dominated by intermediaries. Thus they reiterate the relevance of intermediation capital for asset prices.
This paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 describes the model and derives the capital constraint based on agency considerations. Section 3 solves for asset prices in closed form, and studies the implications of intermediation capital on asset pricing. Section 4 explains the parameter choices in our numerical examples. Section 5 concludes.
The Model

Agents and Assets
We consider an in…nite-horizon, continuous-time, economy with a single perishable consumption good, along the lines of Lucas (1978) . We use the consumption good as the numeraire. There are two assets, a riskless bond in zero net supply, and a risky asset that pays a risky dividend. We normalize the total supply of the risky asset to be one unit.
The risky asset pays a dividend of D t per unit time, where fD t : 0 t < 1g follows a geometric
and g > 0 and > 0 are constants. Throughout this paper fZg = fZ t : 0 t < 1g is a standard Brownian motion on a complete probability space ( ; F; P) with an augmented …ltration fF t : 0 t < 1g generated by the Brownian motion fZg.
We denote the progressively measurable processes fP t : 0 t < 1g and fr t : 0 t < 1g as the risky asset price and interest rate processes, respectively. They will be determined in equilibrium.
There are two classes of agents in the economy, households and specialists. Without loss of generality, we set the measure of each agent class to be one. We are interested in studying an intermediation relationship between households and specialists. To this end, we assume that the risky asset payo¤ comprises a set of complex investment strategies that the specialist has a comparative advantage in managing, and therefore intermediates the households'investments into the risky asset. Throughout this paper we will think of the dividend process from the risky asset as corresponding to a representative "intermediated" asset. This asset is an amalgam of payo¤s from mortgage-backed securities investments, emerging-market investments, investments in long-short liquidity provision strategies, etc. In particular, the risky asset should not be thought of as the S&P 500 stock index.
As in the literature on limited market participation (e.g., Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Allen and
Gale, 1994; Basak and Cuoco, 1998; and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002), we make the extreme assumption that the household cannot directly invest in the risky asset and can directly invest only in the bond market. Following the limited participation literature, we motivate this assumption by appealing to "informational" transaction costs that households face in order to invest directly in the risky asset market.
We depart from the limited participation literature by allowing specialists to invest in the risky asset on behalf of the households. Households allocate some funds to intermediaries that are run by specialists. We can think of an intermediary as a hedge fund or bank investing in mortgage-backed securities or emerging markets'sovereign bonds. The specialist plays the role of insider/manager of the intermediary.
Both specialists and households are in…nitely lived and have log preferences over date t consumption. Denote c t (c h t ) as the specialist's (household's) consumption rate. The specialist maximizes
while the household maximizes
where the positive constants and h are the specialist's and household's time-discount rates, respectively. Throughout we use the superscript "h"to indicate households. Note that may di¤er from h ; this ‡exibility is useful when specifying the boundary condition for the economy.
Intermediaries and Intermediation Contract
At every t, households invest in a continuum of intermediaries that are run by specialists. As detailed in Section 2.5, the market for intermediation is competitive with specialists providing intermediation services, while households purchasing these services. We will think of an intermediary as being invested in by a continuum of identical households, although for ease of exposition we sometimes describe the contracting as between a representative specialist and household.
After the time-t intermediation decisions are taken by specialists and households, the specialists trade in a Walrasian stock and bond market on behalf of the intermediaries, and the households trade in only the bond market. The intermediation relation is short-term, and at t + dt the intermediation market repeats itself.
Consider one of these intermediaries. It is run by the specialist who makes all of the investment decisions. Absent proper incentives, the specialist will shirk some of his investment tasks in order to enjoy a private bene…t. Thus, there is a moral hazard problem that must be alleviated by writing a …nancial contract between specialist and household.
The household is the principal in this relationship and the specialist is the agent. A …nancial contract dictates how much funds each party contributes to the intermediary, and how much each party is paid as a function of realized returns.
Consider a specialist with wealth W and a household with wealth W h . In equilibrium, these wealth levels evolve endogenously. To save notation, we are omitting time subscripts on these wealth levels.
The specialist contributes T 2 [0; W ] into the intermediary. We focus on contracts in which any remaining specialist wealth W T earns the riskless interest rate of r t . This restriction is similar to, but weaker than, the usual one of no private savings by the agent. 6 The household contributes T h 2 0; W h into the intermediary. We refer to T I = T + T h as the total capital of the intermediary.
The intermediary is run by the specialist. We formalize the moral hazard problem by assuming that the specialist makes an unobserved portfolio choice decision and an unobserved due-diligence decision of "shirking" or "working." For any given portfolio choice, if the specialist shirks, the return on the portfolio falls by x dt, but the specialist gets a private bene…t (in units of the consumption good) of bT I dt, where x > b > 0 can be state-dependent, e.g., increasing with risk premia. 7 Throughout we assume that it is always optimal for households to write a contract that implements working from the specialist.
We denote E I as the intermediary's portfolio choice (a decision made by the specialist) measured in units of money invested in the risky asset. In other words, E I is the intermediary's dollar exposure in the risky asset. If the specialist works, the intermediary's total dollar return as a function of the asset position E I is,
where dR t is the return on the risky asset (speci…ed in equation (9) of the next section). Note that when E I > T I , the intermediary is shorting the bond (or borrowing) in the Walrasian bond market.
At the end of the intermediation relationship, the fund is liquidated and each party gets paid based on the contract terms and the return on the fund. We denote 2 [0; 1] as the share of returns that goes to the specialist, and 1 as the share to the household. The specialist may also be paid a fee ofKdt to manage the intermediary. Note that since our model is set in continuous time and there is only one source of risk, it follows from spanning arguments that focusing on linear-share/…xed-fee contract is not a substantive restriction. Any nonlinear contract looks like an a¢ ne contract in this setting. The substantive restriction imposed by our analysis is that we do not consider contracts where one specialist's performance is benchmarked to another's. 8 The household o¤ers a contract
specialist. Given the contract , the specialist makes three decisions: (1) whether to participate in the contract or not; (2) portfolio choice E I ; (3) shirk/work. The household must design the contract in consideration of these specialist decisions.
Reducing the Problem
We …rst reduce the contracting space. Let us write the dynamic budget constraints for both specialist and household:
and,
Substituting from equation (2) we rewrite these equations as,
For any given ( ; T; T h ) we can de…ne an appropriate K = T I T r t +K so that these budget constraints become:
That is, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to contracts that only speci…es a pair
Reducing the problem in this way highlights the nature of the gains from intermediation in our economy. The specialist o¤ers the household exposure to the excess return on the risky asset, which the household cannot directly achieve due to his limited market participation. This is the …rst term in the household's budget constraint (i.e., (1 )E I ). The second term in the household's budget constraint is standard; it is the risk-free interest that the household earns on his wealth. Similar interpretations hold for the specialist's budget equation. The third term is the transfer between the household and the specialist. In Section 2.5, we will come to interpret this transfer as a price that the household pays to the specialist for the intermediation service .
Incentive Compatibility and Household' s Maximum Exposure
We next discuss how varying the contract term a¤ects the household and the specialist in the intermediary. The unobservablity of the portfolio choice decision E has important implications for our problem. With a slight abuse of notation, denote E I as the intermediary's optimal position (chosen by the specialist) in the risky asset given a contract ( ; K), and similarly denote E I0 as the optimal position given a di¤erent contract ( 0 ; K 0 ). We must have the following relation:
where E is the specialist's optimal exposure in the risky asset from the perspective of his own investment/portfolio problem. This relation, which we refer to as "undoing," implies that the contract terms ( ; K) do not have any e¤ect on the specialist's ultimate exposure to the risky asset. The reason is that if is changed, the specialist adjusts his portfolio choice so that his net exposure of E I remains the same. 9 9 One may consider whether it is possible to induce the specialist to choose a di¤erent portfolio by varying the transfer K. On the cost side, giving the specialist a larger transfer K costs the household in the order of dt. On the While undoing implies a portfolio exposure for the specialist that does not depend on the contract, it does not imply the same for the household. For any , the household's post-undoing exposure to the risky asset is,
The household can vary the contract terms, , to achieve his desired exposure to the risky asset.
Setting to one provides zero exposure to the risky asset, and decreasing increases the household's exposure to the risky asset.
Incentive compatibility places a limit on how low can fall. For any total capital T I and return dR t , if the specialist shirks, the intermediary's return falls by xdt and the specialist earns a private bene…t of bT I dt. For working to be incentive compatible, must be such that:
We call the condition (4) the incentive-compatible constraint, and assume that x > b are su¢ -ciently high so that it is always preferable for households to implement working. As the surplus to the household of implementing working rather than shirking depends on the state (e.g., the risk premium), our assumption implicitly requires that x and b may be state-dependent (e.g., increasing
with risk premia). For simplicity, we assume that the ratio b x , which plays the central role in the analysis, is a constant.
From (3), the household's risk exposure is simply E h = (1 )E I = 1 E . The maximum portfolio exposure by the household is achieved when is set to the minimum value of b x . Therefore, the maximum exposure is, 1
where we have de…ned a constant m x b
1. The above constraint says that household's exposure to the risky asset (i.e., (1 )E) is constrained to be less than m times that of the specialist (i.e., E ). The inverse of m measures the severity of agency problems. That is, a lower m implies a more severe agency problem and a smaller maximum exposure.
This maximum exposure constraint
bene…t side, the di¤erence in the household's portfolio exposure induced by varying K, via changing the specialist's wealth, is of order dt. This implies that any potential gain due to the change in the risky asset exposure will only be in the order of (dt) 2 . Therefore it is not pro…table to a¤ect the exposure through the transfer K.
which is rooted in the specialist's incentive compatible constraint, is critical for our model. Because of the underlying friction of limited market participation, the households are gaining exposure to the risky asset through intermediaries. However, due to agency considerations, the risk exposure of households, who are considered "outsiders" in the intermediary, must be capped by the maximum exposure mE , which is m times that of the specialists', or "insiders'," risk exposure.
In our model, households know the specialist's wealth W , his preferences, and the stochastic processes for asset returns. Therefore, even though they cannot directly observe the specialist's portfolio choice decisions, they can compute the optimal exposure E of a given specialist. A specialist with a greater E (which we will see to be linear in his wealth W due to log preferences)
can o¤er a greater maximum exposure. Of course, because the specialists are identical in the model, it is true that along the equilibrium path all specialists have the same E at any time.
Equilibrium Intermediation Contracts 2.5.1 Competitive Intermediation Market
We model the competitive intermediation market as follows. At time t, households o¤er intermediation contracts ( ; K)'s to the specialists; and then the specialists can accept the o¤er, or opt out of the intermediation market and manage their own wealth. In addition, any number of households are free to form coalitions with some specialists. At t + dt the relationship is broken and the intermediation market repeats itself.
De…nition 1 In the intermediation market, households make o¤ ers ( ; K) to specialists, and specialists can accept/reject the o¤ ers. A contract equilibrium in the intermediation market at date t satis…es the following two conditions:
1. is incentive compatible for each specialist.
2. There is no coalition of households and specialists, such that some other contracts can make households strictly better o¤ while specialists weakly better o¤ .
Equilibrium Contracts
Denote E h as the exposure of a household to the risky asset. We argue that given condition (2) in De…nition 1, the equilibrium has to be symmetric with every specialist receiving the fee K, and every household obtaining exposure E h and paying a total fee of K. The argument we present here borrows from the core's "equal-treatment"property in the study of the equivalence between the core and Walrasian equilibrium (see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) Chapter 18, Section 18.B).
Suppose that the equilibrium is asymmetric. We choose the household who is doing the worst-i.e.
receiving lowest utility at some exposure E h and paying a fee K-and match him with the specialist who is doing the worst-i.e. receiving the lowest fee. This household-specialist pair can do strictly better by matching and forming an intermediation relationship. The only equilibrium in which such a deviating coalition does not exist is the symmetric equilibrium.
Next, we argue that in equilibrium, when purchasing risk exposure from the specialists, households are price takers who face a per-unit-exposure price
Thus a household that chooses exposure E h pays kE h to obtain this exposure. The argument is as follows. Suppose that a measure of n (symmetric) households consider reducing their per-household exposure by relative to the equilibrium level E h . To do so, they reduce the measure of specialists in the coalition by n E h , thereby saving total fees of n E h K. Since the allocation is symmetric, each household reduces his fees, per unit , by K E h . A similar argument implies that the households can raise their exposure at a price of k.
Consider a household's portfolio choice problem in investing in an intermediary given this price k. Suppose that each dollar of the risk exposure to the risky asset generates a risk premium of R .
Then, paying the fee of k reduces the household's after-fee return to be R k. It is obvious that the households'demand for risk exposure E h (k) is decreasing in k.
We have so far discussed how k enters into the household's investment decisions. For the specialist, since he has an outside option to trade on his own, it must be that k 0 (i.e., K 0) in equilibrium. 10 We next argue that there are two distinct equilibria that arise: one with k > 0, and the other with k = 0. Which equilibrium arises depends on whether the incentive-compatibility constraint (4) is binding or not.
Suppose that the incentive-compatibility constraint (4) is slack, i.e., > b x . Note that each specialist just earns a pro…t of K = kE h , and households prefer a contract with a lower perhousehold delegation transfer. Then it implies that the equilibrium exposure price k has to be zero.
Otherwise, by forming a coalition with n measure of households and n measure of specialists, and reducing the specialists' share to (n ) n < (so the households' total exposure remains at 1 nE in (3)) without changing the transfer K per-specialist, the new coalition can maintain the same per-household risk exposure at 1 E , lower the per-household transfer, while keep the specialists indi¤erent. This deviation is strictly pro…table unless the transfer K becomes zero, i.e., the exposure price k = 0.
We classify this case as the unconstrained equilibrium, or unconstrained region, where the incentive-compatibility constraint (4) is slack and the per-unit-exposure price k is zero. We can also think about this case in terms of the demand and supply of intermediation. Denote the households' aggregate demand for the risk exposure, given the free intermediation service, as E h (k = 0). The zero-delegation-price equilibrium arises when E h (k = 0) is below the maximum risk exposure mE available in the economy. When this occurs, the economy is in the unconstrained equilibrium, When E h (k = 0) exceeds the aggregated maximum exposure mE s provided by the specialists, we are at the constrained equilibrium, or constrained region. In this case, specialists earn a positive rent K = kmE > 0 for their scarce service. Following the deviating coalition/contract argument as above implies that the incentive-compatibility constraint (4) for every specialist must be binding.
i.e., = b x . Otherwise, invoking our previous argument, households could indeed form a coalition with a specialist whose incentive constraint is slack, thereby lowering their price k.
We summarize these results regarding the equilibrium classi…cation in the following proposition: Proposition 1 At any date t, the economy is in one of two equilibria:
1. The intermediation unconstrained equilibrium occurs when,
In this case, the incentive-compatibility constraint of every specialist is slack.
2. The intermediation constrained equilibrium occurs when there exists a positive exposure price k, such that
In this case, the incentive-compatibility constraint is binding for all specialists. is equal to its minimum value of b x .
Implementation
In Section 2.4, we see that the heart of the agency friction imposes a restriction on the maximum risk exposure that the households can obtain through intermediaries, in that E h mE in (6) . From a slightly di¤erent angle, because E is the specialist's exposure to the risky asset, this restriction dictates a risk-sharing rule between the household and the specialist in the intermediary. In the language of equity contracts, the restriction can be interpreted as one in which the households, as outsiders of the intermediary, cannot hold more than m 1+m (equity) shares of the intermediary. Therefore, the somewhat abstract ( ; K) contract can be implemented and interpreted readily in terms of equity contributions by households and specialists, with the maximum exposure constraint interpreted as an equity capital constraint-i.e., given the specialist's equity contribution W , households can make at most mW equity contributions to the intermediary. Moreover, households pay the specialist an intermediation fee f per-unit of wealth that is invested in the intermediary; then the delegation transfer K can be interpreted as the households'total intermediation cost when they seek equity investment in intermediaries.
The following de…nition gives the equity implementation of our optimal contract. This is the language we use in the rest of the paper when discussing the contracting problem.
De…nition 2 (Equity Implementation)
The equity implementation of the optimal contract is as follows:
1. A specialist contributes all his wealth W t into an intermediary, and household(s) contribute
2. Both parties purchase equity shares in the intermediary. The specialist owns
The counterpart of Proposition 1, which describes the equilibrium conditions in the equity implementation, is Proposition 2 At any date t, the economy is in one of two equilibria:
1. In the unconstrained region, the capital constraint is slack, T h t < mW t , and we have zero intermediation fee f t = 0.
2. In the constrained region, the capital constraint is binding, T h t = mW t , and we have a positive intermediation fee f t > 0.
The equity implementation of our model makes it clear that, along the equilibrium path, the specialists have to absorb no less than 1 1+m of the aggregate risk in this economy, independent of the specialists'wealth. Therefore, under unfavorable economic conditions when their wealth is low, specialists have to bear disproportionately large risk, and as a result asset prices have to adjust to make the greater risk exposure optimal. This tension drives our asset pricing results throughout the paper.
Our modeling of intermediation and the derivation of the capital requirement closely follows Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) . We have adapted the Holmstrom and Tirole assumptions to a setting with risk averse agents and no limited liability, but still recover the capital requirement as the key aspect of intermediation contracts.
We think of the incentive constraint that emerges from the model as similar to the explicit and implicit incentives across many modes of intermediation. For example, a hedge fund manager is typically paid 20% of the return on his fund. We may think of this 20% as corresponding to the minimum fraction that has to be paid to the hedge fund manager in order to provide investment incentives.
The equity implementation and constraint, as argued in Holmstrom and Tirole, is also similar to the capital constraints faced by commercial banks. Stretching the interpretation a bit more, we may also think of the incentive constraint as capturing implicit incentives in the mutual fund industry. There is a well established relation between past performance and mutual fund ‡ows (see, e.g., Warther (1995) ). We can think of this performance- ‡ow relation as re ‡ecting an implicit incentive constraint. As W falls, the households contribution T h falls. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) present a model with a similar feature: the supply of funds to an arbitrageur in their model is assumed to be a function of the previous period's return by the arbitrageur.
The key feature of the model, which we think is robustly re ‡ected across many modes of intermediation in the world, is the feedback between losses su¤ered by an intermediary (drop in W ) and exit by the investors of that intermediary. Our model captures this feature through the capital constraint, when it is binding.
Decisions and Equilibrium
The decision problem of a specialist is to choose his consumption rate c t and the portfolio share in the risky asset t for the intermediary. The share choice t is isomorphic to the exposure choice E I described in Section 2.2, but it is more convenient to work with the former under the equity implementation.
Denote the cumulative return delivered by the intermediary as f dR t . The specialist contributes all of his wealth to the intermediary and earns the return g dR t plus the fee of f t T h t dt. Thus, the specialist's problem is:
where the return delivered by intermediaries g dR t , as a function of t , is
Note that the intermediary's portfolio share t is also the portfolio share on the specialist's own wealth.
The household chooses his consumption rate c h t and funds for delegation T h t , given his wealth W h t . Following the equity implementation of the intermediation contract with delegation fee, the fraction of wealth that is invested with an intermediary is
Then the return on the household's wealth is,
The optimization problem for a household is:
De…nition 3 An equilibrium is a set of progressively measurable price processes fP t g, fr t g, and ff t g, and decisions fT h2. The intermediation decisions satisfy the equilibrium conditions of Proposition 2.
3. The stock market clears:
4. The goods market clears:
Given market clearing in risky asset and goods markets, the bond market clears by Walras'law.
The market clearing condition for the risky asset market re ‡ects that the intermediary is the only direct holder of the risky asset, and the total holding of the risky asset by the intermediary must equal the supply of the risky asset.
Asset Market Equilibrium
We look for a stationary Markov equilibrium where the state variables are (W t ; D t ). It is clear that D t must be one of the state variables, because the dividend process is the fundamental driving force in the economy. Intermediation frictions imply that the distribution of wealth between households and specialists a¤ects equilibrium as well. For example, whether capital constraints bind or not depends on the relative wealth of households and specialists. We have some freedom in choosing how to de…ne the wealth distribution state variable. We choose to use the specialist's wealth W t to emphasize the e¤ects of intermediary capital.
The intrinsic scale invariance (the log preferences and the log-normal dividend process) in our model implies that the scaled specialist's wealth w = W=D is the only state variable to characterize our economy. Indeed, we will see that the equilibrium price/dividend ratio P=D, the risk premium R , the interest rate r, and the intermediation fee f are functions of w only. We write the total return on the risky asset as,
where R is the risky asset's expected return and R is the volatility. The risky asset's risk premium R is simply R r.
Risky Asset Price
A simple argument due to log preferences for both agents allows us to derive the equilibrium risky asset price P t in closed form. For the household with wealth W h t , his optimal consumption is
Likewise the optimal consumption for the specialist is c t = W t . But since the debt is in zero net supply, the aggregated wealth has to equal the market value of the risky asset, i.e.,
Invoking the goods market clearing condition c t + c h t = D t , we solve for the equilibrium price of the risky asset.
Proposition 3
The equilibrium risky asset price as a function of the state variables is:
It follows that the price/dividend ratio is
Taking the limit where the specialist wealth goes to zero, we observe that the asset price P t approaches D t = h . Loosely speaking, this is the asset price for an economy only consisting of households. At the other limit, as the households wealth goes to zero (i.e., W t approaches P t ), the asset price/dividend ratio approaches D t = .
We assume throughout that h > . Then, the asset price is lowest when households make up all of the economy, and increases linearly from there with specialist wealth, W t . This is a simple way of capturing a low "liquidation value" of the asset, which becomes relevant when specialist wealth falls and there is disintermediation. Note that liquidation is an o¤-equilibrium thought experiment, since in our model, asset prices adjust so that the asset is never liquidated by the specialist.
Capital Constraint and Specialist' s Portfolio Share
The specialist chooses the portfolio share t of the risky asset for the intermediary, which is also the portfolio share for the specialist's own wealth invested in the risky asset. We can use the market clearing condition for the risky asset to pin down t . As the capital constraint a¤ects the specialist's exposure to the risky asset, we have to consider two regions depending on whether the capital constraint is binding or not.
First, we argue that if mW t > W h t , then the capital constraint is slack, and we are at the unconstrained region as de…ned in Proposition 2. To see this, we only need to check that the zero intermediation fee f t = 0 leads to an intermediation demand T h t lower than mW t . In fact, we argue that the household's intermediation demand at zero fee is his entire wealth, i.e., T h t = W h t < mW t . The argument is as follows. When f t = 0, both household and specialist face identical investment opportunities. As a result, by purchasing T h t = W h t < mW t amount of equity, the household obtains the same portfolio share as the specialist. Because the specialist makes the portfolio share decision for the specialist, which is therefore the optimal portfolio choice for the specialist, this portfolio choices must also be optimal for the household. In short, when mW t > W h t , households can invest 100% of their wealth into intermediaries, obtaining their optimal exposure to the risky asset.
Therefore, the economy is in the unconstrained region when mW t > W h t . In this case, both household and specialist must have the same portfolio share in the risky asset. Because the riskless bond is in zero net supply, market clearing implies that t = 1.
Second, when mW t < W h t , investing the household's entire wealth into the intermediary T h t = W h t violates the capital constraint. Now we are at the constrained region, and in equilibrium the intermediaries have a total capital of W t plus the household's capital investment of mW t . Since the risky asset must be held by intermediaries, using (10) we …nd the portfolio share in the risky asset to be,
Finally, since W t + W h t = P t , the critical point w c where the capital constraint is binding (mW t = W h t ) can be easily derived as
When the scaled specialist's wealth w w c , the economy is unconstrained; while the economy is constrained when w < w c . The following proposition summarizes our result. . In this region, mW t W h t , and the specialist's portfolio share t = 1.
2. The economy is in the constrained region when w t < Figure 1 : The specialist's portfolio share t in the risky asset is graphed against the scaled specialist wealth w for m = 4 and 6. The constrained (unconstrained) region is on the left (right) of the threshold w c . Other parameters are g = 1:84%, = 12%, = 1%, and h = 1:67% (see Table 1 ).
In Figure 1 we plot the specialist's portfolio share t in the risky asset against the scaled specialist's wealth, the only relevant state variable in our model. The specialist's portfolio holding in the risky asset rises above 100% once the economy is capital constrained, and rises even higher when the specialist'wealth falls further.
Two E¤ects on m: Constraint E¤ect and Sensitivity E¤ect Figure 1 Additionally, Figure 1 shows that in the constrained region, the specialist's portfolio share t invested in the risky asset, through market clearing, rises as the capital constraint tightens. When m is lower, the capital constraint binds for smaller values of w. This in turn means that for a given value of w, the lower the m, the higher the specialist's holding in the risky asset.
There is a second, more subtle, "sensitivity e¤ect"of m, when we consider the economic impact of a marginal change in the specialist's wealth, given some tightness of constraints. This sensitivity e¤ect is rooted in the nature of the capital constraint. When in the constrained region, a $1 drop in the specialist's capital reduces the households'equity participation in the intermediary by $m. A higher m makes the economy more sensitive to the changes in the underlying state, and therefore magni…es capital shocks.
It is possible, although not readily apparent, to see the sensitivity e¤ect in Figure 1 . For the m = 6 case, t rises faster in the constrained region than for the m = 4 case. To analytically show this point, we calculate the derivative of portfolio share t with respect to w t using (11), and evaluate this derivative (in its absolute value) across the same level of t :
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to m, we …nd that,
which is positive for all relevant parameters (recall that t 1 and that h > ). In other words, when m is higher, a change in specialist wealth leads to a larger change in t . While we do not go through the computations in the next sections, this sensitivity e¤ect arises in most of the asset pricing measures that we consider.
The two e¤ects of m shed light on crises episodes. If consider that an economy like the U.S.
has institutions with higher ms, then our model can help explain why crisis episodes are unusual (constraint e¤ect), but on incidence, are often dramatic (sensitivity e¤ect).
In Figure 1 , the observation that the specialist's holding becomes higher in the constrained region is critical in understanding our asset pricing results throughout the paper. Recall that in our model, the specialist, not the household, is in charge of the intermediaries investment decisions.
Thus, asset prices have to adjust to make the higher risk share optimal. The next sections detail the asset pricing implications of our model.
Volatility of Specialist Wealth
We may write the equilibrium evolution of the specialist's wealth W t as
where the drift W and the volatility W are to be determined in equilibrium. By matching the di¤usion term in (13) with the specialist's budget equation (7), it is straightforward to see that,
The volatility of the specialist's wealth is equal to the volatility of the risky asset return, modulated by the position of the risky asset held by the specialist.
Given (10), the di¤usion term on the risky asset price is,
Then,
Combining (14) and (15) we solve for W :
Now based on the equilibrium portfolio share t derived in Proposition 3, we can solve for the volatility of the specialist's wealth.
Proposition 5
In the unconstrained region,
In the constrained region,
Not surprisingly, Figure 2 shows that the volatility of the specialist's wealth displays a similar pattern as that of t . In the unconstrained region, the volatility of the specialist's wealth is constant. In the constrained region, the volatility of wealth rises as the specialist's wealth falls, and the specialist bears disproportionately more risk in the economy. The two e¤ects-constrained e¤ect and sensitivity e¤ects-are also visible from the …gure.
Risky Asset Volatility
Now we are ready to solve for the volatility of risky asset R , as R = W t according to (14) . Figure 2: The volatility of the specialist's wealth W is graphed against the scaled specialist wealth w for m = 4 and 6. The constrained (unconstrained) region is on the left (right) of the threshold w c . Other parameters are g = 1:84%, = 12%, = 1%, and h = 1:67% (see Table 1 ).
Proposition 6
In the unconstrained region, we have,
In the constrained region, we have,
As Figure 3 shows, the volatility of risky asset is constant in the unconstrained region, which is just the dividend volatility . The volatility rises in the constrained region, as the constraint tightens (i.e. W t falls). To see this, equation (15) implies that
We have seen that in Proposition 5, w t W is a constant in the constrained region. Therefore, for smaller scaled specialist wealth w's, R increases because the price/dividend ratio P t =D t falls, a phenomenon consistent with the …re-sale discount of the intermediated assets.
The model can help explain the rise in volatility that accompanies period of …nancial turmoil where intermediary capital is low. It can also help to explain the rise in the VIX index during these periods, and why the VIX has come to be called a "fear" index. We will next show that the periods of low intermediary capital also lead to high expected returns. Taking these results The risky asset volatility R is graphed against the scaled specialist wealth w for m = 4 and 6. The constrained (unconstrained) region is on the left (right) of the threshold w c . Other parameters are g = 1:84%, = 12%, = 1%, and h = 1:67% (see Table 1 ).
together, we provide one possible explanation for recent empirical observations relating the VIX index and risk premia on intermediated assets. Bondarenko (2004) documents that the VIX index helps explain the returns to many di¤erent types of hedge funds. Berndt, et al. (2004) note that the VIX index is highly correlated with the risk premia embedded in default swaps. In both cases, the assets involved are specialized and intermediated assets that match those of our model. Our model suggests that, as intermediaries hit their capital constraints, the intermediation capital-which is the wealth of marginal investors (as specialists in this model)-becomes more volatile, and this translates to rising market volatilities and rising VIX index. At the same time, as we see in the next section, increased volatility gives rise to higher risk premia on the assets that they are trading.
Risk Premium
The key observation regarding our model is that the specialist is in charge of the investment decisions into the risky asset. This means that asset prices have to be such that it is optimal for him to buy the market clearing amount of t . For the households on the other hand, their (indirect) investment in the risky asset may be constrained and a¤ected by the intermediation frictions.
The specialist's Euler equation for pricing risky asset return dR t is,
This expression looks like the standard consumption Euler equation, except for the …rst term mf t dt, which is the total fee that the specialist earns per unit of his wealth. Note that this expression encompasses both regions, as mf t = 0 when the economy is constrained.
To understand this additional term due to the intermediation fee, consider a specialist who decreases consumption today by and uses the to increase his investment in the intermediary.
As in the usual argument, this strategy has a consumption cost today and a gain tomorrow when the proceeds of this investment are consumed. Relative to the usual argument there is a twist in our case, because the increased investment, , attracts further households investment on which the specialist gets a fee. The additional fee amounts to mf t that the specialist can immediately consume. This explains the …rst term in the Euler equation.
We can easily verify that consumption policy of c t = W t satis…es the Euler equation (16) .
Then, dc t =c t is equal to dW t =W t . Applying the Euler equation to risky asset return dR t and to a riskless bond, we …nd,
This is the familiar CAPM pricing result. Since the specialist has log preferences, a CAPM holds with the market portfolio de…ned as the return on the specialist's wealth.
Proposition 7
Since both R and W rise as W t falls, the risk premium on the risky asset rises through the constrained region, as shown in Figure 4 . It is easy to show that this pattern also prevails for the Sharpe ratio.
An interesting point of comparison for our results is to the literature on state-dependent risk premia, notably, Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), and Kyle and Xiong (2001) . In these models, as in ours, the risk premium is increasing in the adversity of the state. In Campbell and Cochrane, the state dependence arises because marginal utility is dependent on the agent's consumption relative to his habit stock. In Barberis, Huang, and Santos, the state dependence comes about because risk aversion is modeled directly as a function of the Other parameters are g = 1:84%, = 12%, = 1%, and h = 1:67% (see Table 1 ).
previous period's gains and losses. Relative to these two models, we work with a standard CRRA utility function, but generate state dependence endogenously as a function of the frictions in the economy.
For empirical work, our approach suggests that measures of intermediary capital/capacity will help to explain risk premia. In this regard, our model is closer in spirit to Kyle and Xiong who generate a risk premium that is a function of "arbitrageur"wealth. The main theoretical di¤erence between Kyle and Xiong and our model is that the wealth e¤ect in their model comes from assuming that the arbitrageur has log utility, while in our model it comes because the intermediation constraint arises endogenously as a function of intermediary capital under an explicitly modeled delegation friction. One clear di¤erence across these models is revealed in the sharp asymmetry of our model's risk premia: no dependence on capital in the unconstrained region and a strong dependence in the constrained region. In Kyle and Xiong, the log utility assumption delivers a risk premium that is a much smoother function of arbitrageur wealth. Plausibly, to explain a crisis episode, one needs the type of asymmetry delivered by our model.
Intermediation fee
We now turn to the intermediation market to determine the equilibrium intermediation fee. In Section 2.5 we have shown that in the unconstrained region, the excess supply of intermediation service implies that households pay zero fee (f t = 0) when purchasing equity shares in the intermediaries. In the constrained region, when households purchase equity claims of intermediaries, the total supply of outside equity is binding due to the capital constraint-or more fundamentally, due to the agency problem in the delegated asset management. Then, the competitive intermediation market gives rise to a positive intermediation fee f t > 0 for the scarce intermediation service.
Let us solve for f t in the constrained region. With log preference, the specialist's portfolio choice is myopic and mean-variance e¢ cient. Speci…cally, given his wealth W t , the specialist's optimal (dollar) exposure in the risky asset is
where R ( R ) is the risky asset's risk premium (volatility). 13 Note that the specialist's optimal exposure is not a¤ected by the intermediation fee f t .
The households'demand for exposure, on the other hand, is decreasing with the intermediation fee. The equilibrium fee f t then equates the demand with the (inelastic) supply. To …nd the equilibrium fee f t , it is easier to derive the equilibrium price of risk exposure k t …rst. Log preferences implies that the household is myopic and mean-variance e¢ cient. However, as discussed in Section 2.5.2, the household's e¤ective risk premium from obtaining exposure in the risky asset is the risk premium R , minus the delegation cost k t per unit of exposure. Therefore the household's demand for risk exposure is,
In the constrained equilibrium, mE = E h and E h + E = P = W h t + W t . These relations imply that
Finally, since we can express the total delegation transfer K t as either k t mE or f t T h t = f t mW t , the equilibrium per-unit wealth intermediation fee is
Plugging in the previous results, we have the following result: Other parameters are g = 1:84%, = 12%, = 1%, and h = 1:67% (see Table 1 ).
Proposition 8
In the unconstrained region, the intermediation fee is
In the constrained region, the intermediation fee is
In Figure 5 , the intermediation fee displays a similar pattern as the risk premium in Figure   4 . This is intuitive: the higher risk premium in the constrained region implies a higher household demand for investment in intermediaries to gain access to the higher risk premium. Because the supply is …xed at mW t , to clear the intermediation market, the equilibrium fee rises.
The higher intermediation fee is the logical result of our model of scarce supply of intermediation.
However, it seems counterfactual that during a crisis period in which agency concerns may be widespread, that specialists can demand a higher fee from their investors. One resolution of this anomalous result is to assume that households, lacking the knowledge of the risky asset market, are also not aware of time variation in the risk premium on the risky asset. That is, they are not aware of the current state of the economy. For example, one can explore a model in which households hold static beliefs over the mean-variance ratio of the payo¤s delivered by intermediaries. This model may deliver the result that fees are state independent, thereby resolving the counterfactual result on fees. We do not pursue this extension here.
On the other hand, the positive intermediation fee can also be seen as a re ‡ection of the scarcity of the specialists' capital. This take on the fee re ‡ects one of the key points of our model: intermediation capital becomes increasingly valuable during the liquidity event when the intermediary sector su¤ers more losses. Thus the intermediation fee f t also measures the shadow price of the scarce intermediary capital in this economy. The following example illustrate this point.
Example: Lending Spreads and Market Liquidity
During periods of …nancial turmoil in the intermediary sector, the terms of credit for new loans get worse. That is, lending spreads rise, even on relatively safe borrowers. In our model, we can interpret this rise as re ‡ecting the scarcity of intermediary capital.
We interpret the intermediary now as not just a purchaser of secondary market assets, but also a lender in the primary market. That is, the intermediaries are commercial banks or investment banks. Suppose that a borrower (in…nitesimal) asks the intermediary for a loan at date t to be repaid at date t + dt, with zero default risk. We denote the interest rate on this loan as R t , and ask what R t lenders will require.
Suppose that making the loan uses up capital. That is to say, if a specialist makes a loan of size , he has less wealth (W t ) available for coinvestment with the household in the intermediary.
In particular, if in the constrained region, the lender is able to attract m less funds from the households. 14 If mW t > W h t , intermediation capital is not scarce and thus R t = r t . However, if intermediation capital is scarce, then using intermediation capital on the loan reduces the size of the intermediary.
A lender could have used the in the intermediary to purchase the riskless bond yielding r t and received a fee from households of mf t . Since both investments are similarly riskless, we must have that,
We have seen that falling into the constrained region causes the intermediation fee f t to rise, and so does the lending spread mf t .
In this example, even a no-default-risk borrower is charged the extra spread of mf t . The key reason is that the specialist-intermediary is marginal in pricing the loan to the new borrower, so that the opportunity cost of specialist capital is re ‡ected in the lending spread. If we had assumed that households could also have made such a loan, then we will …nd that R t = r t . Of course a business loan, which requires expertise and knowledge of borrowers, is the prime example of an intermediated investment. 15 
Interest Rate and Flight to Quality
We can derive the equilibrium interest rate r t from the household's Euler equation, which is
The equilibrium condition gives us,
Recall that the specialist's budget equation,
Using the expressions for t , R , and f t that have been derived previously, we have the following result:
Proposition 9 In the unconstrained region, the interest rate is
In the constrained region, the interest rate is
We observe that in the unconstrained region, the interest rate is decreasing in the scaled specialist's wealth w (recall that < h ). This just re ‡ects the divergence in both parties'discount rates.
In the limiting case where W t = Dt , the economy only consists of specialists. Then, consistent Other parameters are g = 1:84%, = 12%, = 1%, and h = 1:67% (see Table 1 ).
with the familiar result of an economy with specialists as representative log-investors, the interest rate converges to + g 2 . For a smaller w, where households play a larger part of the economy, the bond's return also re ‡ects the households'discount rate h , and the equilibrium interest rate is higher.
In the constrained region, the pattern is reversed: The smaller the specialist's wealth, the lower the interest rate. This is because the capital constraint brings about two larger e¤ects that reinforce each other. First, when the capital constraint is binding, the result in Proposition 3 implies that the specialists bear disproportionately greater risk in this economy: The specialist's wealth volatility increases dramatically, and more so when the specialist's wealth further shrinks. As a result, the volatility of the specialist's consumption growth rises with the tightness of the intermediation constraint, and the precautionary savings e¤ect increases his demand for the riskless bond. Second, as specialist wealth falls, households withdraw equity from intermediaries and channel these funds into the riskless bond. The extra demand for bonds from both specialist and households lowers the equilibrium interest rate.
The pattern of decreasing interest rate presented in Figure 6 is consistent with a " ‡ight to quality."Households withdraw funds from intermediaries and increase their investment in bonds in response to negative price shocks. This disintermediation leaves the intermediaries more vulnerable to the fundamental asset shocks.
Illiquidity and Correlation
In the capital constrained region, an individual specialist who may want to sell some risky asset faces buyers with reduced capital. Additionally, since households reduce their (indirect) participation in the risky asset market, the set of buyers of the risky asset e¤ectively shrinks in the constrained region. In this sense, the market for the risky asset "dries up." On the other hand, if a specialist wished to sell some bonds, then the potential buyers include both specialists as well as households.
Thus the bond is more liquid than the risky asset.
There are further connections we can draw between low intermediary capital and aggregate illiquidity periods. As we have already seen, a negative shock in the constrained region leads to a rise in risk premia, volatility, and fall in interest rate. In this subsection, we show that our model also generates increasing comovement of assets that many papers have documented as an empirical regularity during periods of low aggregate liquidity (see, e.g., Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2000). We illustrate this point through two examples.
Example 1: Orthogonal Dividend Process
We introduce a second asset held by the intermediaries. 16 The asset is in in…nitesimal supply so that the endowment process and the equilibrium wealth process for specialists is unchanged. We assume that the dividend on this second asset is:
Here, Z t is the common factor modeled earlier; andẐ t is a second Brownian motion, orthogonal to Z t , which captures the asset's idiosyncratic variation. Put di¤erently, this second asset is a noisy version of the market asset. The correlation between the market return and the return on an individual asset, corr(dR t ;dR t ), is graphed against the scaled specialist wealth w for m = 4 and 6. The constrained (unconstrained) region is on the left (right) of the threshold w c . Other parameters are g = 1:84%, = 12%, = 1%, h = 1:67% (see Table 1 ), and^ = 12%.
We can show that the price of this second asset is given by, 17
Consider the correlation between dR t and the returndR t on the second asset:
In the unconstrained region, since R is constant, the correlation is constant. But, in the constrained region, as R rises, the common component of returns on the two assets becomes magni…ed, causing the assets to become more correlated. We graph this state-dependent correlation in Figure 7 , where we simply take^ = .
Example 2: Liquidation-sensitive Asset 1 7 The steps to show this result are as follows. For the market asset, the Euler equation for the specialist is,
Since, asset that pays o¤ X T at the maturity date T , where the dividend is state-contingent, i.e., X T = X (W T ; D T ). We are interested in how the economy-wide shocks drive the asset price, when the asset is subject to forced liquidation. A simple way to explore this idea is to assume that this dividend
is received only if the economy-wide intermediary capital W T at the maturity date is above a minimum threshold W ; below this threshold the asset pays less, which we normalize to zero for simplicity.
To this end, we study a liquidation-sensitive zero-coupon bond, with the state-contingent payo¤ as
For example, this asset re ‡ects an investment-grade corporate bond or a mortgage backed-security that is at low risk during normal times. However, during a period of low intermediation capital, the asset value is determined by an exogenous …re-sale value, which we have normalized to be zero. Denote the time-0 price of this liquidation-sensitive asset as Q 0 (W; D) = Q 0 (W 0 ; 1), which is simply the time-0 present value of X (W T ; D T ) under the pricing kernel in this economy. We focus on the constrained region to illustrate the interesting dynamics in this example, and perform the computations numerically.
The value of this liquidation-sensitive zero-coupon bond Q 0 (W 0 ; 1) varies with the state of the economy. Interestingly, the sign of the correlation switches depending on the state. Consider a negative shock to this economy causing intermediary capital W to fall. A lower W leads to a lower interest rate in the constrained region, which in turn leads to a higher bond price. This interest rate e¤ ect generates a negative correlation between the returns of our (intermediated) market risky asset and the liquidation sensitive asset. The pattern prevails for high levels of intermediary capital.
When the intermediary capital W 0 is su¢ ciently low, i.e., in the vicinity of the liquidation boundary W , an opposite liquidation e¤ ect kicks in. Under this e¤ect, a negative shock makes forced liquidation more likely, and the price of the liquidation-sensitive asset falls. As a result, there is positive correlation between the market return and the asset return. The instantaneous covariance between the returns of intermediated market asset and the liquidation-sensitive asset, i.e., cov(dR; dQ 0 (W 0 ; 1)). The x-horizontal is the time-0 specialist's wealth w = W 0 ; as we normalize D 0 = 1. We take m = 4, so the capital constraint binds at w c = 13. The liquidation threshold is W = 3:57. Other parameters are g = 1:84%, = 12%, = 1%, and h = 1:67% (see Table 1 ).
Figure 8 graphs these two e¤ects by considering the instantaneous covariance between dQ 0 (W 0 ; 1), and the market return dR t . When the scaled specialist's wealth is high, the correlation is negative, although close to zero for the parameters in our example. The covariance becomes more negative as W 0 shrinks due to the interest rate e¤ect. Finally, when W 0 falls around W (which is 3:57 in our example), the liquidation e¤ect dominates, and the liquidation-sensitive asset comoves with the intermediated market asset.
Liquidity factor
A number of recent papers have provided evidence that asset returns are driven by both a market factor and a liquidity factor (see Amihud, 2002 , Acharya and Pedersen, 2003 , Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003 , and Sadka, 2003 . These empirical papers suggest that the marginal investor is particularly averse to holding assets with low payo¤s in episodes of low aggregate liquidity, consistent with the logic of our model in which a capital-constrained intermediary is the marginal investor. We next show that our model can indeed rationalize a liquidity factor.
To show this result, we extend the model to include a second source of shocks. Since the model is driven by a single source of uncertainty (the one-dimensional Brownian motion governing dividends), changes in both the risky asset price and intermediary capital are perfectly correlated.
This makes it di¢ cult to clarify the role of a liquidity factor for asset returns separate from the market factor. In our model, the intermediated-market factor is itself a¤ected by liquidity.
We consider the following thought experiment. We perturb our model by adding a second shock process that is orthogonal to dividends, but directly a¤ects intermediary capital. We then trace the e¤ects of this second factor on asset returns. This exercise gives us some understanding of the separate, additive, role of intermediary capital risk, without working out a full-blown two-factor model.
We imagine that nature randomly redistributes a small amount of wealth between specialists and households (we can also think about this as tax/transfer by the government). The redistribution to specialists is l D t dZ l;t , where Z l;t is orthogonal to Z t and l = ! 0. Thus this second shock process is small compared to the primary dividend process. Without loss of generality we assume l > 0. The shock is scaled by D t for ease of comparison.
The transfer adds a random disturbance to the wealth evolution equations for specialists and households. But since l ! 0, both agents'consumption policies of eating a fraction of wealth is close to optimal (up to an error in the order of 2 l ). 18 Then, the same equilibrium argument as o¤ered earlier implies that the risky asset price is
We write the di¤usion terms on the specialist's percentage wealth evolution dW=W as,
We focus on the di¤usion terms since we are interested only in understanding how the new factor a¤ects risk premia. Given the risky asset price P t , we can write the di¤usion terms on dR t as, . In this sense, as l ! 0, the consumption policy is near optimal. A similar argument applies to the specialists, so that we take their consumption policy to be unchanged as well. The volatility loading of the specialist's wealth on the second shock dZ l;t is graphed against the scaled specialist wealth w for m = 4 and 6. The constrained (unconstrained) region is on the left (right) of the threshold w c . Other parameters are g = 1:84%, = 12%, = 1%, h = 1:67% (see Table 1 ), and l = 100 = 0:12%.
There are two contributing sources in the di¤usion term of the specialist's wealth growth dW=W : …rst, the specialist has a position of t in the risky asset; second, the specialist's wealth has a percentage shock of l Dt
Wt dZ l;t = l wt dZ l;t due to wealth redistribution. Then we can go back through the steps of matching coe¢ cients on the di¤usion terms in (18) , and …nd that W is the same as The risk premium on the risky asset now re ‡ects the new shock process, 19
1 9 The risk premium on the risk source of dZ l;t is just R;l W;l , where R;l is the loading of dRt on dZ l;t . Now we have W;l = t R;l + l w t , i.e., the percentage change of specialist's wealth due to dZ l;t equals the sum of two contributions from holding risky asset and the wealth redistribution. Therefore R;l = W;l l w t t , and the result follows.
The last term on the right-hand side is new relative to our previous expressions. This term re ‡ects the e¤ect of shocks to intermediary capital on the market's expected return. The shock dZ l;t has no direct e¤ect on dividends and hence on prices of risky assets; rather, it a¤ects prices through a liquidity channel. Endogenously the risk aversion of the specialist is a¤ected by changes in w t , and hence the asset prices and consumption are a¤ected by dZ l;t .
We next consider the pricing of a second asset in order to derive a cross-sectional asset pricing model. We introduce an in…nitesimal amount of asset-j whose return process dR j t has di¤usion terms,
We can rearrange this expression, and write the above di¤usion as the sum of the loading on the market return, and the loading on the new liquidity risk dZ l;t (recall the R;1 expression derived in footnote 19): We then arrive at the main result of this section.
Proposition 10
The risk premium of asset-j satis…es a two-factor asset pricing model: 
Here, E t [dR t ] r t dt is the risk premium for the market factor, and W;l dt is the risk premium for an asset with unit of loading on the liquidity factor dZ l;t .
The …rst term on the right hand side of (20) is the return on asset-j for bearing market risk, with its sensitivity as
For example, an asset with a higher j loads more heavily on the market return, and therefore has a higher market .
The second term on the right hand side of (20) We say "additional" return, because the market return already re ‡ects a premium for bearing liquidity risk. Thus, the additional return comes from the added liquidity risk of asset-j. Assets whose returns load more heavily on the dZ l;t shock (i.e. higher j l ) have a higher liquidity . Table 1 lists the parameter choices that are used in the graphs presented in the previous section.
Parameter Choices
The parameter choices are based on matching a hedge fund crisis episode such as the 1998 crisis.
We choose parameters so that the intermediaries of the model resemble a hedge fund, and the asset of the model re ‡ects those of a hedge fund. It is worth stressing that the parameter choices should be viewed not as a precise calibration but rather as a plausible representation of a hedge fund crisis scenario. The multiplier m parameterizes the intermediation constraint in our model. We choose m based on standard hedge fund contracts. We note that m measures the share of returns that specialists need to receive in order to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints. Hedge fund contracts typically pay the manager 20% of the fund's return in excess of a benchmark, plus 1 2% of funds under management (Fung and Hsieh, 2006) . A value of m = 4 implies that the specialist's inside stake is 1=5 = 20%. The 20% is an option contract so it is not a full equity stake. The percentage fee 1% is on funds under management and therefore grows as the fund is successful and garners more in ‡ows. Thus, a 20% stake is in the range of parameters that may reasonably capture a hedge fund manager's inside stake. We also present an m = 6 case to provide a sense as to the sensitivity of the results to the choice of m.
The risky asset cash ‡ows are governed by growth rate g and volatility . Hedge funds invest in a variety of complex investment strategies each with their own cash ‡ow characteristics. We apply the model to …t an amalgam of these strategies, rather than any single type of hedge fund. As a benchmark for such an amalgamate strategy, we use the aggregate stock market and set = 12%
and g = 1:84%. As another benchmark, Chan, et al. (2005) report the volatility of returns on di¤erent categories of hedge funds, …nding standard deviations ranging between 3% to 17%. They also note that these numbers underestimate the true volatility of returns, because the underlying assets of hedge funds are illiquid and there is evidence that hedge funds smooth reported returns.
We set and h to match a riskless interest rate in the unconstrained region around 1%. The ratio of to h measures the ratio of the lowest value of P=D to the highest value of P=D (reached at the two endpoints where W h = 0 and W = 0). We set this ratio to be 60%. This choice is based on thinking about a "liquidation"value for the risky asset, and loosely, from considering the Warren Bu¤ett/AIG/Goldman Sachs bid for the LTCM portfolio. This bid was reported to be $4 billion for a 90% equity stake, suggesting a liquidation value of $4:44 billion for LTCM's assets.
LTCM was said to have lost close to $3 billion of capital at the time of this bid, suggesting that LTCM lost 40% of its value to arrive at the liquidation price of $4:44 billion. Our calculation here is clearly rough.
Conclusion
We have presented a model to study the e¤ects of capital constraints in the intermediary sector on asset prices. Capital e¤ects arise because (1) households lack the knowledge to participate in the risky asset; and, (2) intermediary capital determines the endogenous amount of exposure that households can achieve to the risky asset. The model builds on an explicit microeconomic foundation for intermediation. The model is also cast within a dynamic economy in which one can articulate the dynamic e¤ects of capital constraints on asset prices. We show that the model can help to explain the behavior of asset markets during aggregate liquidity events and can rationalize a liquidity factor for asset returns.
There are a number of interesting directions to take this research. First, the model we have presented has a degenerate steady-state distribution, which means that we cannot meaningfully simulate the model. For typical parameter values, the specialist will eventually end up with all of the wealth. This aspect of the model is well-known and arises in many two-agent models (see Dumas, 1989 , for further discussion). He and Krishnamurthy (2008) analyze a closely related model, which has a non-degenerate steady-state distribution. That model is su¢ ciently complex that it does not allow for the simple closed-form solutions of this paper. There, we solve the model numerically and simulate to compute a number of asset pricing moments.
A second avenue of research is to expand the number of traded assets. Currently the only non-intermediated asset in the model is the riskless bond. However, in practice, even unsophisticated households have the knowledge to invest in many risky assets directly, or to invest in low intermediation-intensive assets such as an S&P500 index fund. It will be interesting to introduce a second asset in positive supply in which households can directly invest, and study the di¤erential asset pricing e¤ects across these di¤erent asset classes. This exercise seems particularly relevant in light of the evidence in the fall of 1998 that it was primarily the asset classes invested in by hedge funds that were a¤ected during the crises. We intend to investigate these issues more fully in future work.
